1. Leibniz The Monodology, sec. 17, from Philosophical Classics ed. by W. Kaufmann, Prentice-Hall 1961, p227-8

2. Experiments of von Bekesy, cited in Karl Pribram Languages of the Brain Prentice-Hall 1971 p167-71

3. Plato The Republic,VII 514, transl. by Francis M. Cornford, Oxford UP 1945 p227-8

4. A.J. Ayer The Problem of Knowledge, Penguin 1956, p37 (quoting an analogy of Ryle's)

5. Plato op cit p229

6. Gordon R. Taylor The Natural History of the Mind Secker & Warburg 1979 p193-5

7. Robert Rosen Life Itself Columbia UP 1991, p47-8

8. Sigmund Freud "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (1911), sec. 4, in A General Selection of the Works of Sigmund Freud ed. by John Rickman, Liveright 1957, p43

9. In the same vein, 'This sentence is not green' could be "formally" expanded as "'This sentence is not green' is green"-- in contrast to its unrelativized expansion as "'This sentence is not green' is true". The statement is subjectified or relativized when the predicate ("greening") replaces the truth function, so that the sentence does not refer beyond its own terms (i.e. to a larger world in which it could be true or false).

10. David Hume An Enquiry into Human Understanding, sec. 7 part 1, in Kaufmann op cit p352-3

11. Fred Dretske "Misrepresentation" in Mind and Cognition, p130

12. Claude Jumarie Synthese pour une Cybernetique Relativiste Montreal 1980, p56-58

13. Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela Autopoeisis and Cognition D. Reidel 1980. I owe much to this seminal work, including the concept of cognitive domain elaborated in section 16.

14. John Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind 1992, p84 Searle contrasts pain as something which ought not to be treated in the same way as the sensation of heat (which clearly betokens the action of radiation or kinetic energy of molecules) because in the case of pain he is interested in the affect itself (he calls it the "appearance", and confesses [p126] to be suffering from back pain, which apparently is not traceable to an injury and therefore lacks a referent).

15. Hiram Caton The Origins of Subjectivity: an Essay on Descartes Yale UP 1973, p87-8

16. Humberto Maturana "Cognitive Function in Particular", p26, in Maturana and Varela op cit

17. Xenophanes in Kaufmann op cit, vol 1, p16

18. Maturana and Varela op cit

19. Thomas Nagel "What it is like to be a bat" in Mortal Questions, Cambridge UP 1979, p167

20. cf. Frank Jackson "Epiphenomenal Qualia" in Mind and Cognition, p474

21. Bernard J. Baars "Conscious Contents Provide the Nervous System with Coherent, Global Information" in Consciousness and Self-Regulation vol 3, ed. by R.J. Davidson et. al., Plenum Press 1983

22. David Chalmers The Conscious Mind, Oxford UP 1996, p156

23. R. Rosen op cit

24. Vernor Vinge "Technological Singularity" Whole Earth Review #81, Winter 1993, p88ff. The term "singularity" was used earlier by Von Neuman in regard to runaway technology.

25. Eric Drexler Engines of Creation Anchor/Doubleday 1986

26. Maturana and Varela op cit

27. Desmond Morris The Naked Ape andThe Human Zoo

28. John Searle, Intentionality 1983, p262-3

29. cf. Daniel Dennett The Intentional Stance reprinted 1989

30. D. Parfitt Reasons and Persons, 1984

31. cf. G.R. Taylor op cit p209: the experience of the pioneer psychologist Kenneth Craik who (deliberately) burned a hole in his retina through exposure to the sun. He reported two days later that the missing part of the visual field was subjectively filled in.

32. Annecdote reported by H.L. Teuber in Brain and Conscious Experience ed. by John Eccles 1966, p193

33. Keith Oatley Perceptions and Representations Methuen 1978, p3-4 and 190-1

34. Nelson Goodman Ways of Worldmaking Hackett 1978, p72ff (discussing Paul Koler's experiments in Aspects of Motion Perception Pergamon 1972)

35. ibid

36. Karl Pribram op cit p256

37. Eccles (ed.) op cit p175

38. Eric Harth Windows on the Mind p199-202

39. Daniel Dennett Consciousness Explained 1991

40. Early experiments of Stratton, embellished by others in several variations.